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Morrison: Foreword: Criminal Justice Responses to the Economic Crisis

FOREWORD: CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSES
TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
Caren Myers Morrison*
“Epidemics seldom end with miracle cures. . . . ‘Merely chipping
away at the problem around the edges’ is usually the very best thing
to do with a problem; keep chipping away patiently and, eventually,
you get to its heart.”1
The rate of incarceration in the United States has reached epidemic
proportions.2 While this fact is well known, the comparators still
have the power to shock: there are “more African Americans under
correctional control today—in prison or jail, on probation or parole—
than were enslaved in 1850,”3 the United States keeps over 80,000
inmates in solitary confinement,4 and there are more people
incarcerated in the United States today than in the Stalinist gulags at
their height in 1953.5 This has come at significant financial cost:
State prison expenditures have increased from $2.8 billion to $50
billion over the past 30 years.6 The bulk of these increases are due to
*

Assistant Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. My thanks to the Law Review staff and,
in particular, to the Symposium editors, Mary Ellen Lighthiser and Jennifer Frazier West, for their hard
work and attention to detail in putting together an excellent program.
1. Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America, NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012), available at
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30/120130crat_atlarge_gopnik.
2. Since the late 1970s, the number of inmates in American prisons and jails increased from
300,000 to a peak of approximately 2.3 million in 2008. See Pew Center on the States, One in 100:
Behind
Bars
in
America
2008,
at
5
(2008),
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2008/one%20in%20100.pdf [hereinafter Pew
Center Report]. The numbers of people incarcerated in state and federal prisons and local jails have
declined slightly since the high of 2,308,400 in 2008 to 2,266,800 in 2010. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
Correctional
Population
in
the
United
States,
2010,
at
3
(Dec.
2011),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf.
3. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 175 (2010).
4. See Angela Browne et al., Prisons Within Prisons: The Use of Segregation Within the United
States, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 46, 46 (2011) (noting that, as of 2005, there were 81,622 prisoners in
solitary confinement).
5. See Gopnik, supra note 1.
6. Marshall Clement et al., The National Summit on Justice Reinvestment and Public Safety:
Addressing
Recidivism,
Crime,
and
Corrections
Spending
16
(Jan.
2011),
http://justicereinvestment.org/summit/report [hereinafter Justice Reinvestment Report]. Together,
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policy choices, particularly at the prosecutorial and local level, that
send more violators to prison, and to a lesser extent, to innovations
such as three strikes laws, mandatory minimums and other sentencing
enhancements that keep them there longer.7
Worse, our country’s insatiable appetite for incarceration feeds on
itself. Mass incarceration has been likened to a disease that is itself
criminogenic, as “[v]ery high rates of imprisonment concentrated in
specific communities cause social disorganization, undermining the
normal social controls of family and community that are the best (and
most natural) guarantors of good behavior.”8 The enormous socials
costs inflicted by high incarceration rates tend to be focused on
particular communities; those that suffer from the highest crime rates
end up having high proportions of their population incarcerated,
further destabilizing the community and leading to more crime and
thus more incarceration.9 And corrections spending also competes
with the funding states need to devote to other programs that could
reduce crime in the long run, such as early childhood education.10
But the global financial crisis has forced the country to confront
the fact that these choices have become unsustainable. At a time
when states are facing severe budget shortfalls, and some
municipalities have even filed for bankruptcy,11 states can no longer
federal, state, and local governments spent $69 billion on corrections in 2006. Linh Vuong et al., The
Extravagance of Imprisonment Revisited, 94 JUDICATURE 70, 71 (2010). Even adjusted for inflation,
modern prison expenditures are 4.5 times what they were 30 years ago. See John F. Pfaff, The
Durability of Prison Populations, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73, 76–77 (2010).
7. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding sentence of 25 years to life for
defendant convicted of stealing three golf clubs, priced at $399 each, under California’s “Three Strikes”
law).
8. ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS INCARCERATION IN
AMERICA 106 (2011).
9. See Sharon Dolovitch, Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237,
241 (2009) (noting that mass incarceration “operates to create a class of permanently marginalized and
degraded noncitizens, marked out by the fact of their incarceration for perpetual social exclusion and
ongoing social control”).
10. Pew Center Report, supra note 2, at 16.
11. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Alabama Governor Fails to Prevent County’s Record $4 Billion
Bankruptcy
Filing,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
9,
2011,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/us/alabama-governor-fails-to-prevent-jefferson-countys-record-4billion-bankruptcy-filing.html; Sabrina Tavernise, City Council in Harrisburg Files Petition of
Bankruptcy,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
12,
2011),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/us/harrisburg-pennsylvania-files-for-bankruptcy.html.
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afford to house so many prisoners. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown v. Plata, which held that the overcrowding in California’s
prisons was so severe that it violated the cruel and unusual
punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment,12 was the most public
recognition yet that the situation was untenable.
The economic crisis has forced legislators and government
officials to face issues that they had previously been able to ignore:
whether incarceration is the best use of resources to deal with nonviolent offenders,13 whether former inmates should be sent back to
prison for violations of conditions of their post-conviction release,
rather than for new criminal activity,14 whether sentences should be
so long that the prison population becomes increasingly geriatric.15
12. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011). In Plata, the Supreme Court upheld a lower
court’s order to California to reduce its prison population to 137.5 percent capacity within two years,
which will require California to release or reassign over 30,000 prisoners. See id. at 1923.
13. Many of those incarcerated have been convicted of relatively minor crimes. One study has found
that a quarter of the nation’s inmates are serving time for “nonserious, nonsexual offenses,” such as
petty theft, drug possession offenses, minor traffic offenses, drunkenness, liquor laws, public order,
juvenile offenses, and misdemeanors. Vuong, supra note 6, at 71. It is estimated that the United States
could save as much as $9.7 billion by using alternative sentences for those convicted of nonserious
crimes, such as drug treatment, electronic monitoring, and reporting systems. Id. at 72–73. These
measures could be at least as effective as incarceration in rehabilitating offenders and reducing
recidivism, while incurring much lower societal costs. See id. at 71.
14. In 2005, parole violators accounted for more than one third of all prison admissions, up from
17% of prison admissions in 1980. See RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, CHANGING
DIRECTION?: STATE SENTENCING REFORMS 2004-2006, at 11 (Mar. 2007), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/sentencingreformforweb.pdf; WILLIAM J. SABOL, ET
AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006 (2007), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pjim06.pdf. One third of those who are returning to prison for
probation or parole violations committed a technical violation. See King, supra at 11. In up to a quarter
of technical violations, no new crime has been alleged. See Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing
Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307,
317 (2009). Clear and Austin estimate that the rate of parole revocation could be reduced up to twothirds by eliminating technical violations and implementing “graduated strategies” to respond to
misconduct in the community, rather than returning technical violators to prison. See id. at 318 (citing
AMY SOLOMON, ET AL., URBAN INST., PUTTING PUBLIC SAFETY FIRST: 13 PAROLE SUPERVISION
STRATEGIES
TO
ENHANCE
REENTRY
OUTCOMES
(2008),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411800_public_safety_first.pdf). These strategies have been
implemented with success in several states, including Texas, Kansas, Arizona and New Hampshire. See
Justice Reinvestment Report, supra note 6, at 56–67.
15. The National Institute of Corrections found a 173% increase in the number of prisoners over 50.
See JAYE B. ANNO ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INST. OF CORRECTIONS, ADDRESSING THE
NEEDS OF ELDERLY, CHRONICALLY ILL, AND TERMINALLY ILL INMATES (2004). This, in turn, causes
increased costs for medical care as state systems lodge an increasing proportion of older prisoners. See
id.
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At the same time, taxpayers are beginning to realize that they are
not always getting a decent return on their corrections dollar. Crime,
and the fear of it, is no longer dominating the domestic agenda, due
to unprecedented drops in reported crime rates.16 And fiscal
conservatives are edging out “tough on crime” rhetoric with
proposals to be “smart on crime.”17
The reaction to these straightened circumstances has ranged from
the downright miserly and short-sighted, such as billing inmates for
their stays in county jail,18 to reforms that may actually improve the
system. Some states have implemented evidence-based practices and
programs that have dramatically reduced the risk of recidivism by
released offenders,19 or have combined evidence-based practices and
cost-savings in innovative ways.20
16. Our current crime rate is roughly equivalent to that of the early 1970s. See generally Pew Center
Report, supra note 2. What is notable is that the drop in crime does not seem due to the increase in
incarceration. As the National Center on Justice Reinvestment and Public Safety points out, from 2000
to 2007, Florida’s prison population increased by 16%, while New York’s decreased by 16%. But New
York experienced a drop in crime that was double that of Florida’s. See Justice Reinvestment Report,
supra note 6, at 4.
17. As Michael Vitiello points out, criminal justice reform is no longer simply the province of wellmeaning liberals and rehabilitation advocates. Prominent conservative leaders such as Newt Gingrinch
and Ward Connelly have endorsed the “Right on Crime” campaign, which calls for sensible and proven
reforms. See Michael Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration: Why Is California Lagging Behind?, 28
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1273, 1283–84 (2012).
18. See, e.g., Christina Hall, Jail Inmates Get Billed for Stay—But Few Pay, DETROIT FREE PRESs,
Feb. 7, 2011. This is but one of the penny-pinching changes that seem of little value beyond their minor
savings, such as reducing food costs for inmates by switching from hot breakfasts to cold cereal,
charging them for underwear, or having inmates perform routine maintenance tasks such as mowing
lawns and caring for buildings. See, e.g., Colleen Jenkins, Florida Jail Ends Free Underwear for Jail
Costs, REUTERS.COM, July 15, 2011.
19. See Pew Center on the States, State of Recidivism: The Revolving Door of America’s Prisons, at
22–23,
26
(2011),
available
at
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2011/Pew_State_of_Recidivism.pdf
(noting
decline in recidivism rates in Missouri and Arizona).
20. Mississippi changed its policies for non-violent inmates, making them eligible for release after
serving 25% of their sentence rather than 85%. Even better, Mississippi also instituted restitution centers
that allow inmates convicted of property crimes to work for businesses in the community to repay what
they
owe
their
victims.
See
Restitution
Centers,
MISS.
DEP’T
OF
CORR.,
http://www.mdoc.state.ms.us/restitution_centers.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2012). It’s still a small
program—the state has four restitution centers that house 60 people—but it’s an elegantly designed
solution that offers rehabilitation and work experience to the inmates, saves the state money, and opens
opportunities for employment after release. Texas invested $241 million in transitional programs for
non-violent inmates, particularly residential and non-residential treatment. It changed its drug penalties
for first-time drug offenders, mandating that first-time drug offenders who possess less than a gram of
narcotics receive probation rather than prison time.
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In time, more sweeping reforms should be considered. As it is
easier to facilitate reentry and avoid recidivism if people stay out of
the system altogether, we might want to rethink whether those
arrested for committing certain low-level crimes, such as minor drug
possession, should be prosecuted in the first place.21 Or we could
consider full legalization of vice activity, as it offers a potentially rich
source of new tax revenues.22
But controversial, large-scale reforms are not the only way to
make a lasting difference. To the contrary, waiting for sweeping
change may put even the best-intentioned reformers in a state of
paralysis, making the problems seem overwhelmingly huge.23 Just as
the crime wave crested and subsided, so there may be a chance for
21. Laws criminalizing marijuana possession—and their vigorous enforcement—come at an
extraordinarily high cost. Currently, those convicted of marijuana possession may be sentenced to one
year in prison, and about 15,000 people receive prison sentences for marijuana possession per year. 21
U.S.C. § 844 (2006); Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, No Rational Basis: The Pragmatic Case for
Marijuana Law Reform, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 43, 44, 59 (2009). Arrests for possession of
marijuana constitute thirty-nine percent of all drug arrests annually, and ninety percent of all marijuanarelated arrests. See id. at 46 n.9 (citing FBI Uniform Crime Reports). Blumenson and Nilsen have
estimated that “the state and federal government poured at least $7.7 billion into marijuana prohibition
in the year 2004.” See id. at 53.
22. Catherine Boyle, Could Legally Getting High Reduce the Deficit?, CNBC, June 23, 2011,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/43508025. Marijuana is currently California’s largest cash crop, and it remains
entirely untaxed. See J. James P. Gray, The Hopelessness of Drug Prohibition, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 521,
554 (2010). Experts estimate that legalization of marijuana alone could bring in an estimated 13 billion
dollars of tax revenue annually. See Jeremy Singer-Vine, A Toke And A Tax: If Governments Legalize
Marijuana, How Much Revenue Can They Raise From It? SLATE, June 10, 2009,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2009/06/a_toke_and_a_tax.html
(quoting
Harvard economist Jeffrey Miron). Paired with reductions in enforcement costs and reductions in prison
populations, savings from legalization could exceed $25 billion per year. See Troy E. Grandel, One Toke
Over the Line: The Proliferation of State Medical Marijuana Laws, 9 U. N.H. L. REV. 135. 153–54
(estimating that marijuana arrests in 2006 cost state and local government more than $10 billion). New
sources of tax revenue could similarly be generated by legalization, regulation, and taxation of
commercial sex activity. Charlie LeDuff, Nevada Turns to Brothels as a Budget Fix, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 2003, at A7.
These efforts would mirror decriminalization efforts that have already received broad support.
Although gambling was almost uniformly prohibited in past decades, states have increasingly embraced
state-sanctioned gambling activities, including lotteries, as revenue-generating mechanisms. See Chris
Sieroty, Revenue From Gambling, Lotteries Rises in U.S. in ‘10, LAS VEGAS BUS. PRESS, July 4, 2011,
available at http://www.lvbusinesspress.com/articles/2011/07/04/news/iq_45422936.txt.
23. To read the literature on crime before it dropped is to see the same kind of
dystopian despair we find in the new literature of punishment: we’d have to end
poverty, or eradicate the ghettos, or declare war on the broken family, or the like,
in order to end the crime wave.
Gopnik, supra note 1.
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our incarceration trends to reverse themselves. “The truth is,”
observed one commentator of the drop in crime rates, “a series of
small actions and events ended up eliminating a problem that seemed
to hang over everything. There was no miracle cure, just the
intercession of a thousand smaller sanities.”24 Maybe an
accumulation of incremental changes might add up to an overall shift
in focus, away from the punitive overreliance on incarceration, and
towards a more just, evidence-based and cost-effective justice
system.
So it seems possible that we may be at a new tipping point, one
that may be capable of nudging us towards a virtuous cycle of less
incarceration, more mental health and drug treatment, and possibly
less criminalization. Though the motivations of the conservative and
the liberal may diverge, their goals may be aligned. The goal of the
Symposium, held in Atlanta on January 27, 2012, was to bring
together a number of scholars and practitioners to see how the
moment might be leveraged to produce sustainable change.
Cognizant of the ephemeral quality of reform that is solely costdriven, the participants proposed a variety of solutions that could
have staying power, even after the good times return.
Some of the articles in this Symposium Issue propose some of the
“smaller sanities” that might help chip away at the problem, while
providing important theoretical grounding for these proposals. But
the Symposium didn’t just offer a useful toolbox of practical
solutions; it also provided perspective. We could not have achieved
our status as the most punitive nation on earth if we were not, on
some unspoken level, quite comfortable with this state of affairs. It is
easy to lock up great numbers of people if they are not perceived as
the same as us.
Bernard Harcourt, in his keynote address, raises the question of
how we come to determine who is excludable as a deviant and a
criminal and who is not. Harcourt suggests that this exclusion, though
shaped by race, goes beyond it—after all, the mass
institutionalization of the mid-twentieth century was concentrated in
24. Id.
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mental hospitals and confined a much older, whiter, and more female
population. Why can some anti-social behavior (shoplifting, say, or
selling drugs) so easily be labeled as criminal while other, equally
anti-social behavior (contributing to widespread economic
misfortune) is not? A prominent academic who accepts $124,000 to
talk up Icelandic investments on the eve of Iceland’s economic
collapse creates more far-reaching and lasting social harm than the
person who shoplifts an item from a store or sells a rock of crack on
the corner. So why, asks Harcourt, is the latter seen as a criminal, but
the former is not?
It is true that we understand petty theft in a visceral, intuitive way,
quite different from the way we may or may not understand credit
default swaps. But it’s more than that. The persistence with which
some behaviors seem not to register as criminal at all seems
connected to what Harcourt identifies as our fundamental conception
of the role of government. People seem to believe that government
“cannot be trusted to regulate issues like conflicts of interest that
might result in publications of tainted studies, because those raise
more complicated economic questions. But the state can be trusted to
crack down severely on young kids engaged in the drug business.”25
And part of unraveling the net of mass incarceration may be
disentangling ourselves from the idea that incarceration is what
governments do—that government is incompetent in economic
matters and is primarily competent in policing and security matters.
David Ball and John Pfaff bring a meticulous analysis of
incarceration data to inform the discussion. Both Pfaff and Ball
emphasize the important role that county actors play in the decision
to charge, and by extension, to incarcerate. Most studies focus on
national and state actors, but the real action is happening at the
county level.26 Pfaff’s work illuminates the fact that it’s not
necessarily the harshness of the penalties that has driven the increase
in prison population so much as it is prosecutorial choices. And these
25. Bernard Harcourt, Keynote: The Crisis and Criminal Justice, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 980
(2012).
26. See John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1237
(2012).
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choices are made without effective constraints, since prosecutors can
“overuse” prison beds without repercussions as the state, not the
county, pays for them.
Ball’s article explores the link between county policies and state
prison overcrowding by examining data from the fifty-eight counties
in California. His study makes the concept of the “corrections free
lunch” unusually concrete.27 Even in the wake of Brown v. Plata,
California has done no more than pass a bill that subsidizes counties
so they can reabsorb their prisoners based on their previous usage.
Ball instead proposes a model in which any amount of prison
consumed over the state average would be paid for by the localities.
“Charging for prison usage is more narrowly targeted at reducing
unjustified use.”28
Whether California will be capable of this kind of sensible reform
remains to be seen, as Michael Vitiello’s cautionary piece indicates.29
Due to the power of the prison guards’ union, and its symbiotic
relationship with the victims’ rights lobby, there are powerful forces
that want to keep the policy-driven over-incarceration going.
But in terms of sheer extravagance, it is hard to beat the death
penalty, which absorbs millions of dollars and years of litigation for
every case.30 Russell Covey offers a new and potentially viable
alternative to this wasteful practice: replacing it with an ultimate
sentence of Death in Prison.31 As Covey astutely points out, “you
can’t beat something with nothing,” and simply abolishing the death
27. W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not Drive
California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—and Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 987, 991 (2012).
His comparison of Alameda and San Bernardino counties is particularly instructive. The two counties
have populations of similar size, and similar amounts of reported violent crime and property crime, yet
San Bernardino’s prison population was twice that of Alameda and it sent, on average, more than three
times as many new felons to prison each year. In dollar terms, San Bernardino cost the state $93 million
a year more than Alameda for new felon admissions, and an additional $236 million a year more than
Alameda to house its prison population. When counties’ deviations from state policy are subsidized by
their neighbors, there is little incentive to stop.
28. Id. at 1076.
29. See generally Vitiello, supra note 17.
30. One of Covey’s most startling statistics is that, dividing the amount of money spent by California
on death penalty litigation and imprisonment divided by the number of executions actually carried out,
puts the price tag per execution at about $13 million. Russell D. Covey, Death in Prison: The Right
Death Penalty Compromise, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1083, 1113–14 (2012).
31. Id. at 1115–19.
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penalty leaves life without the possibility of parole as the ultimate
penalty. But life without parole is a sentence with significant
symbolic shortcomings. Onerous though the penalty may be in
practice, the fact remains that it sounds as if the offender has gotten
away with something.32 The virtue of Death in Prison is that it has the
ring of finality. And in a time when a single death penalty
prosecution can cost four million dollars, it is a sensible way to
reduce costs.
Cara Drinan argues for a revival of the executive power of
clemency—another reform that might appear to be small-scale in its
application, but would contribute to an important shift in
perspective.33 She posits state clemency grants as a response to
systemic criminal justice failings as well as a public gesture of
compassion.34 Drinan points out that political actors’ fear of
clemency as political suicide are probably off the mark, as decisions
such as Brown v. Plata may now provide political cover for
clemency.35
Larry Eger and Randolph Jonakait emphasize how much any
reform needs to be “sold” to the players on the ground and how
defense lawyers should not hesitate to join forces with fiscal
conservatives. Eger, the public defender for the Twelfth Judicial
Circuit of Florida, has dealt firsthand with the political realities of the
justice system and knows that compromise and cooperation can be
the key to success.
Matthew Parlow suggests that this is a good time to reevaluate
community policing, the proactive local policing model marked by
community engagement, order maintenance, and crime prevention.36
While community policing has been publicly popular, it has not been
32. The words that resonate most in that phrase are “life” and “parole,” two things that are anathema
to death penalty supporters.
33. Cara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1121 (2012).
34. Id. at 1125. Drinan attributes the decline of executive clemency over the past fifty years in part to
increasing harshness in political discourse on crime as well as to clemency’s appearance as an
illegitimate practice rooted in favoritism. See id. at 1128–30.
35. See id. at 1136–38.
36. Matthew J. Parlow, The Great Recession and Its Implications for Community Policing, 28 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1191 (2012).
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without cost, as it has led to a significant number of arrests of people
for relatively minor offenses, which can clog the courts and in the
worst cases, can “result in economic ruin for the arrestee” triggering
another cycle of offense and reincarceration.37 Parlow too points out
some of the better measures some states have adopted that marry cost
savings to lasting social benefits, such as lower recidivism rates and
less disruption to the lives and support systems of those convicted.38
Here in Georgia, the General Assembly has recently passed House
Bill 1176, by unanimous votes in both the House and the Senate.39
HB 1176 lowers penalties for minor drug possession crimes,
reclassifies some classes of theft from felonies to misdemeanors and
establishes legislative authority for drug courts and mental health
courts. The bill unquestionably exhibits a bipartisan consensus that
the state can no longer afford to respond to social issues purely with
incarceration—in 2010, Georgians paid over $1.1 billion to house
53,704 inmates in the state’s jails and prisons.40 But in its best light,
it may represent something more—an important shift in thinking
from reflexive punitiveness to a greater concern with policies that
work.
The day after the Bill’s approval, the College of Law hosted a
roundtable on criminal justice reform, attended by a range of players
in the state criminal justice system.41 Although the perspectives of
the attendees spanned a broad range, from members of the ACLU
and the Southern Center for Human Rights to the Commissioner of
37. Id. at xxx12.
38. By enabling at least low-level, non-violent offenders to avoid going through the prison system in
the first place, counties can not only save money now, but can avoid more difficult re-entry issues later.
See id. at xxx23. Dallas County, Texas, recounts Parlow, not only saved $400,000 in the first year of its
house arrest program, but also saw 273 out of 281 offenders successfully complete the program. See id.
39. See HB 176, as passed by House and Senate, 2012 Ga. Gen. Assem., available at
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/Display/20112012/HB/1176 (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
40. See VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: GEORGIA FACT SHEET (Jan. 2012),
available at http://www.vera.org/files/price-of-prisons-georgia-fact-sheet.pdf.
41. These included two public defenders, the District Attorney for Cobb County, an executive
director of the Georgia ACLU, the executive director of the Southern Center for Human Rights, the
Deputy Police Chief of the Atlanta Police Department, the Commissioner of the Department of
Corrections, the Chairman of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, a Drug and Mental Health Court judge,
and a Chief Probation Officer. Together, they represented a wide spectrum of participants in the
criminal justice system in Georgia.
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Corrections and the Deputy Chief of the Atlanta Police Department,
all agreed that reforms are necessary, not only to ameliorate the
state’s struggling finances, but to improve public safety and
strengthen communities. Maybe events like this Symposium and the
roundtable are a sign that people are beginning to pay attention. And
maybe, in time, a succession of creative and common-sense steps,
focused on results rather than politics and punitiveness, will help
usher out the age of over-incarceration.
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